D066F3
Kubernetes
☸️ Etcd Honey Data
Fake secrets injected into etcd backing store.
What it is
Inject fake secrets and configuration data directly into etcd (the K8s backing store). Attackers who gain direct etcd access (a critical cluster compromise) will find planted credentials that lead to DOAR-controlled infrastructure.
Implementation requirements
- Direct etcd access (extremely privileged — only for dedicated honey clusters)
- Fake secrets stored under realistic key paths (
/registry/secrets/production/db-credentials) - Monitoring: etcd audit logs, or wrapper proxy logging all reads
- Rollback: Back up etcd, then delete the planted keys and revoke the credentials they lead to.
- Upkeep: Check that planted data survives etcd restores and migrations. Quarterly proof-of-life read.
Technologies
Kubernetes
ATT&CK coverage 2
| Technique | Tactic | Status | Confidence | Tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1552.007 Container API |
Credential Access | confirmed | strong | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (2 sources)
| ||||
| T1611 Escape to Host |
Privilege Escalation | confirmed | strong | T3 |
| ↳ Detection point: seen once the attacker is working inside a high-fidelity decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (1 source)
| ||||
Evidence
- Container Orchestration Honeypot: Observing Attacks in the Wild — Spahn, N.; Hanke, N.; Holz, T.; Kruegel, C.; Vigna, G., RAID 2023 peer-reviewed
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — MITRE 2026 standard
Research basis: Extension of container orchestration honeypot research (RAID 2023).