D044F1
Endpoint
🍪 Browser Session Deception
Planted fake session cookies in sqlite databases.
What it is
A browser session cookie that only the lure ever holds, for a decoy application or a decoy session on a real one. Information-stealing malware harvests cookies in bulk to hijack sessions without a password. When the cookie is replayed from a new device or address, the application logs it.
Implementation requirements
- Run a decoy web application or a decoy session on a real one, and issue a session cookie that only the lure ever holds
- Plant it by logging in once from the target machine's browser profile, so the browser stores the cookie itself. Writing to the cookie database directly is fragile, because modern browsers encrypt cookie values
- Monitoring: the application logs any request presenting that session. Information-stealing malware harvests cookies in bulk, so a replay from a new IP address or device is the signal
- Safety: the session authorises nothing real. OPSEC: cookie name, domain and expiry consistent with the application it imitates
- Rollback: Invalidate the session server-side. Clear it from the browser profile.
- Upkeep: Refresh the session before it expires. Monthly proof-of-life replay from a test device.
Technologies
Endpoint
ATT&CK coverage 4
| Technique | Tactic | Status | Confidence | Tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1056 Input Capture |
Collection | confirmed | strong | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the decoy fires at a later step of the attack | ||||
↳ Evidence (2 sources)
| ||||
| T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie |
Credential Access | confirmed | strong | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the decoy fires at a later step of the attack | ||||
↳ Evidence (3 sources)
| ||||
| T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers |
Credential Access | confirmed | strong | T4 |
| ↳ Detection point: the decoy fires at a later step of the attack | ||||
↳ Evidence (3 sources)
| ||||
| T1217 Browser Information Discovery |
Discovery | theoretical | moderate | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the decoy fires at a later step of the attack | ||||
↳ Evidence (3 sources)
Listing bookmarks is not logged; a decoy bookmark to a canary hostname fires when visited. | ||||
| ↳ Honey bookmarks — industry-only evidence. | ||||
Evidence
- Decoy Session Token (D3-DST) — MITRE D3FEND standard
- Browser Honeytoken Detection for Infostealers — Hookset 2026 industry
- MITRE Engage — adversary engagement matrix and ATT&CK mapping — MITRE 2022 standard
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — MITRE 2026 standard