D042F2
Storage
📦 Honey Backup/Snapshot
Decoy EBS/RDS snapshots for data recovery attack detection.
What it is
Decoy backups or snapshots named like production backups and holding synthetic data. Ransomware operators delete backups before encrypting, and data thieves restore or share them. Deleting, sharing or restoring a decoy backup are logged writes that give early warning of the sweep.
Implementation requirements
- AWS: decoy recovery points (AWS Backup) or RDS snapshots named like production backups, holding synthetic data. Azure: Recovery Services backup items. GCP: Backup and DR backups or Cloud SQL backups
- Monitoring: logged writes naming the decoy, such as deletion (
DeleteRecoveryPoint,DeleteDBSnapshot), sharing to another account (ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute), or a restore (StartRestoreJob,RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot) - Ransomware operators delete backups in bulk before encrypting, so the decoy catches the sweep early. Treat any delete of a decoy backup as a response trigger
- Safety: synthetic data only, marked internally. OPSEC: retention and schedule like real backups
- Rollback: Delete the decoy recovery points or snapshots. Remove sharing permissions first, if any were set.
- Upkeep: Create new decoy backups on the real backup schedule. Quarterly proof-of-life delete attempt from a test principal.
Technologies
AWSAzureGCP
ATT&CK coverage 4
| Technique | Tactic | Status | Confidence | Tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1578 Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure |
Defense Impairment | theoretical | moderate | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (3 sources)
Moderate: behaviour and log signal are documented; no study or product shows honey instances or snapshots specifically. | ||||
| T1578.001 Create Snapshot |
Defense Impairment | theoretical | moderate | T2 |
| ↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (2 sources)
| ||||
| T1485 Data Destruction |
Impact | theoretical | moderate | T4 |
| ↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (4 sources)
Deleting a decoy snapshot or database is a management event; deleting objects in a decoy bucket needs data events enabled. | ||||
| T1490 Inhibit System Recovery |
Impact | theoretical | moderate | T4 |
| ↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy | ||||
↳ Evidence (2 sources)
Moderate: behaviour and log signal are documented; no study or product shows honey snapshots specifically. | ||||
Evidence
- Decoy Object (D3-DO) — MITRE D3FEND standard
- Logging management events — AWS CloudTrail User Guide — Amazon Web Services industry
- MITRE Engage — adversary engagement matrix and ATT&CK mapping — MITRE 2022 standard
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — MITRE 2026 standard