🖥️ Honey Container Image

Decoy images in ECR/ACR/GCR registries.

→ Explore in ATT&CK matrix (6 mappings) Deployment detail

What it is

A decoy container image in a registry, with a realistic repository name and tag history and honeytokens inside its layers. Attackers pull images to look for embedded credentials and source code. The pull is logged by the registry, and any honeytoken taken from the image alerts again when it is used.

Implementation requirements

Push a decoy image to ECR, ACR or Artifact Registry with a realistic repository name and tag history. Use a real base image, not an empty one
Monitoring: AWS records image pulls as BatchGetImage and GetDownloadUrlForLayer in CloudTrail. Azure: ContainerRegistryRepositoryEvents via a diagnostic setting. GCP: Artifact Registry Data Access logs (enable DATA_READ)
Layer a second tripwire inside the image: honeytokens (D006) in environment files or config, which alert if someone runs the image and uses them
Safety: the image contains no real code, credentials or internal hostnames; no workload is configured to pull it
OPSEC: tags, push dates and size consistent with neighbouring repositories
Rollback: Delete the image and repository. Revoke any honeytokens baked into its layers.
Upkeep: Push new tags at a cadence like real repositories. Quarterly proof-of-life pull.

Technologies

AWSAzureContainerGCP

ATT&CK coverage 6

Technique	Tactic	Status	Confidence	Tier
T1204.003 Malicious Image	Execution	theoretical	weak	T2
↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy
↳ Evidence (1 source) MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — ATT&CK v20 documents T1204.003 Malicious Image as an adversary behaviour. No source shows a decoy observing a user running a malicious image.
T1610 Deploy Container	Execution	confirmed	strong	T3
↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy
↳ Evidence (3 sources) Container Orchestration Honeypot: Observing Attacks in the Wild — High-interaction Docker and Kubernetes honeypots were attacked within minutes; attackers requested privileged containers on the open Docker daemon and created Pods and a DaemonSet to run XMRig. Docker Honeypot Reveals Cryptojacking as Most Common Cloud Threat — An exposed Docker API honeypot received 850 attacks in 50 days; Kinsing was the most common. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — T1610 procedure examples: TeamTNT, Kinsing and Doki deploy containers via exposed container APIs.
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise	Initial Access	theoretical	weak	T2
↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy
↳ Evidence (1 source) MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — ATT&CK v20 documents T1195 Supply Chain Compromise as an adversary behaviour. The compromise happens upstream of the defender.
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain	Initial Access	theoretical	weak	T2
↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy
↳ Evidence (1 source) MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — ATT&CK v20 documents T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain as an adversary behaviour. The compromise happens upstream.
T1525 Implant Internal Image	Persistence	theoretical	moderate	T2
↳ Detection point: the attack step itself touches the decoy
↳ Evidence (2 sources) Logging management events — AWS CloudTrail User Guide — Control-plane changes (create, modify, delete) are management events, logged by default. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — ATT&CK v20 documents T1525 Implant Internal Image as an adversary behaviour.
T1612 Build Image on Host	Stealth	theoretical	moderate	T2
↳ Detection point: seen once the attacker is working inside a high-fidelity decoy
↳ Evidence (2 sources) Decoys Cannot Go Everywhere: Mapping the Deception Surface in MITRE ATT&CK (companion data) — Valeros et al. rate T1612 as feasible (medium) for infrastructure deception. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — ATT&CK v20 documents T1612 Build Image on Host as an adversary behaviour.

Evidence

Decoy Object (D3-DO) — MITRE D3FEND standard
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.0 — MITRE 2026 standard
2023 Honeypotting in the Cloud Report — Orca Security 2023 industry
GitGuardian Honeytoken — core concepts — GitGuardian industry